Connecting Historical Dots: The Legacy of the Japanese Internment Camps & Muslim American Discrimination Today (Event Review)

For my History of Houston class I am taking this semester, I am required to go to 2 events (of my choosing) and write a summary report of the event. I chose to go to an event at the Asia Society of Texas Center where they would discuss the legacy of the Japanese Internment Camps during World War II in comparison to Muslim American Discrimination today. In attending this event, I had already prior knowledge of the Japanese Internment camps as I had once taken a class on Chinese as well as Japanese History; for those that are unaware, I wrote a paper also on the atomic bomb during World War II for that class and the paper enabled me access to my second research conference. That being said, I was able to recall the things I learned from my Japanese History class, as well as my own personal research from those days, but until learning of this event, I didn’t think to relate these events to what is happening to Muslim Americans today. I recommend everyone to learn more about this as well as meet a Muslim and hopefully lose any misconceptions you may have about Muslims. I invite you to start with me.

The following essay is being written in my own tone, not my persona’s. 

Prior to going inside the building of the Asia Society of Texas Center, I saw what appeared to be a relatively small crowd of people a few feet away holding signs and a few American flags. After I parked my car, my friend and I made our way to the building and got a better look at the crowd and I was correct in what I thought it was, a protest. A protest against what, however? Telling the true story of one of the most horrific events in U.S. History and comparing that with Muslim discrimination today?  Yes. Because according to the protesters: it was preposterous to view Muslims as victims of discrimination due to the numerous terrorist attacks around the globe caused by Muslims and Radical Islamic Terrorism. Moreover, it was a chance for these protesters to also express their disdain to why the United States should allow Syrian Refugees to enter the country; also I would be remiss to not bring up how at one particular moment, the gentleman operating the megaphone made it a point mention that they were not attempting to be racist by having this protest. Suffice it to say, I had heard enough.

I was lucky enough to get a front row seat to the actual event meeting and saw Dr. Abbie Grubb, a scholar on Japanese History (especially involving Japanese Interment in World War II), discuss how the United States demonstrated fear and panic against a people from a particular race because they were at war with them and felt they were spies for the Japanese army and in order to be safe, lock them up in camps. In turn, Mustafa Tameez, a leading political player for the city of Houston, would tie that history together with today’s panic and distrust of Muslims in the United States and how the travel ban issued by our president has become more reactive than proactive. Moreover, Tameez brought up the false statistics of Muslim Americans potentially being radicalized and involved in groups such as ISIS because there are 10,000 members in ISIS and over a billion Muslims in the world; therefore, the United States should essentially calm down.

The talk was not only interesting, but what was most intriguing was the ability for some individuals to be so quick to jump to conclusions without recognizing the consequences that can emerge from acting too impulsive. By learning our history, we should be able to acknowledge how previous leaders handled situations and the backlash that emerged should most definitely not be repeated; and by learning, in general, about other cultures and other nations, we can see that the differences among ourselves and other individuals to be scarce. Rather than fearing for our lives and impulsively looking for a quick fix to solve our problems, we should face them head on. And then watch and learn as our issue becomes gradually smaller and even more so, a misunderstanding.

-Ahmed H. Sharma 

Written on the 27th of February, 2017

 

The Question of Hypocrisy: British Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Dedicated to all the people in and from Palestine; things will get better, inshAllah. Also I dedicate this essay to the scholars of Middle Eastern Studies like my professor, Abdel Razzaq Takriti, who have and continue to work tirelessly to put the pieces of history together, with the hopes of bringing about a better tomorrow. Your work is not going unnoticed and I strive to be in a position such as yours, very soon.

For more information on Palestine, please visit this website:  http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/

The following essay is a research paper I submitted for a class I took this semester entitled: Palestine and the Making of the ArabIsraeli Conflict. I really enjoyed this class and the research I did in writing this essay while extensive, was enticing in every way. Though the words I write are controversial as they are condemning the ignored actions of certain nations and people have taken to colonize another group of people, the words unabashedly had to be said and with that, I believe in the work I’ve produced and my empirical vigor will undoubtedly enable me in my scholarly endeavors.

 

It can be argued that it is human nature to seek approval from others and even attempt to make everyone happy although inarguably, it is impossible to do so. In the simplest of reasons, the impracticality is because one cannot make someone else happy without taking away someone else’s happiness.[1] In 1917, Lord Arthur James Balfour attempts to do just that with the Balfour Declaration, promising British assistance in establishing a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, after a series of discussions and debates, in order to appease the interests of the Zionists. In doing so however, Balfour has established the first of what will become many strands, that together make up a metaphorical spider web of neglected pleas of the present Arab population. Therefore, the intent of this essay is to contend that the British, alongside the Zionists, sought to strategically and purposefully, exploit the Arab Natives of Palestine in order to produce the Jewish State of Israel, despite Balfour professing in his Declaration to not infringe upon the rights of the Native Arab Population. This is proven largely in part due to the incessant neglect of Arab concerns, vagueness in promises made to address Arab concerns, and unheeded cautions by non-Arab notables to bandage broken promises.

As soon as the Balfour Declaration was passed, along with the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the land was divided amongst the French and British, as agreed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Naturally, there was opposition from the Arab natives (Christian and Muslim) but most significantly, there was pressure from the at the time, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who was reluctant with the idea of European nations being in control of a non-European population. To reiterate, the feeling amongst the native Arabs was mutual as described in the King Crane Commission that:

 

with the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or [Muslims] proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians-those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to [Muslims], are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for [Muslims] and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. [2]

 

Still, the British Government and members of the Peace Conference (members of the Triple Alliance after WWI) remained unmoved by this concern from the Arabs, and the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews, was to remain implemented. Despite the urging in the document to the notables forewarning that “The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms.”[3]

 

In order to fully grasp the gravity of the situation and why these concerns of the Arabs are treated as trivial, one must go back into the depths of history and see how it all started. During the Ottoman Empire, which at the time surrounded Palestine and what would later be known as the State of Israel, possessed a religiously diverse population; albeit despite an immense Muslim population, historians agree that citizens lived in relative harmony. Due to “the majority of the culture of Christians and Jews was like that of Muslims: determined not just by religious affiliation, but by geographical and social location.”[4] Meaning, that the idea of what dogma was practiced was irrelevant; especially if the social status of the individual was considered prosperous. However, this was not the case for Jews in Europe, where anti-Semitism was rampant and Jews, as Theodor Herzl described:

 

Wherever [the Jews] live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted…The forms of persecutions vary according to the countries and social circles in which they occur. In Russia, imposts are levied on Jewish Villages; in Rumania, a few persons are put to death; in Algeria, there are travelling agitators; In Germany, they get a good beating occasionally; in Austria, anti-Semites exercise terrorism over all public life; in Paris, the Jews are shut out of the so-called best social circles and excluded from clubs.[5]

 

Therefore, a solution was needed and quickly; the solution being, a safe-haven for the Jewish people. And the location of this sanctuary, was to be Palestine, a land they believed, from biblical times was owned by the Jews, and therefore, the time came for them to return and reclaim what rightfully belonged to them.

 

However, in doing so, the position of the Jewish question of Palestine [was] at the opening of the new era in which practical efforts took the place of dreams and theological disputations and the province hitherto monopolized by divines and philosophers was invaded by statesmen and other men of affairs.”[6] This was mainly due to the attitude Herzl developed towards the native Arab population, which was a “thoroughly repugnant image of Palestine, describing its towns and villages as no better than animal quarters.”[7]

 

It would be irremissible however, to not mention that Herzl was subsequently willing to be flexible in regards to the location of the Jewish state. Although, Palestine was the first choice, Herzl knew that the only way the Jewish people would be successful in acquiring a state of their own would require help from one of the major European powers. Therefore, as Herzl stated, “should the Powers declare themselves willing to admit our sovereignty over a neutral piece of land, then the Society will enter into negotiations for the possession of this land. Here two territories come under consideration, Palestine and Argentine.”[8]

One could make the assumption that Herzl, in his eagerness for European support, was willing to compromise with whatever that was handed to him. For instance, “in 1902, seeking the Al-Arish area in the Sinai Peninsula because it was adjacent to Palestine and could serve as an opening for future demands for expanded migration to the area. Joseph Chamberlain then British Colonial secretary, replied by suggesting land in British-Controlled East Africa, now part of Kenya. Though initially hostile to this idea, Herzl later saw it as granting a temporary haven that might give the Zionists leverage in their demands for Palestine.” [9] However, the idea of anything save Palestine was out of the question to other Zionists and for even the suggestion of this by Herzl, led other Zionists to suspect Herzl of being willing to abandon Zionism.  

Some Jewish notables such as essayist, Ahad Ha’am believed that in theory, the establishment of a Jewish state worked but was impractical as a result of many conflicting factors such as: “In the West it is the problem of the Jews, in the East the problem of Judaism. The one weighs on the individual, the other on the nation. The one is felt by Jews who have had a European education, the other by Jews whose education has been Jewish.”[10] Meaning that there was a strong disconnect amongst the people of Judaism and that their beliefs and ethics were on completely different wavelengths.  Ha’am argues, that Zionists were:

so spiritually far removed from Judaism, and have no true conception of its ­­­­­­nature and its value. Such men, however loyal to their State and devoted to its interests, will necessarily regard those interests as bound up with the foreign culture which they themselves have imbibed and they will endeavor, by moral persuasion or even by force, to implant that culture in the Jewish State, so that in the end the Jewish State will be a State of Germans or Frenchmen of the Jewish race.[11]

Future scholars such as Muhammad Ali Khalidi, will attest to this and ask the paradoxical question: “Why did Herzl, while explicitly disavowing utopianism, write of a utopia advocating ideas at variance with his own ideological principles, especially when the society described does not seem distinctively Jewish?”[12]

Unsurprisingly, the Muslim inhabitants were not pleased with the idea of Zionists taking the land they felt belonged to them. “As might be expected, the same thing is true of the resident Christians. Interestingly enough, the Palestinian Jews are also as much opposed…”[13] Not only were the citizens that were predominantly Muslim feeling even more hostility towards the foreigners but were also feeling a strong disdain for the Jewish population in particular; a group of people they once gave the Dhimmi status (a protected status for non-Muslims). Ottomans also were trying their best to prevent any sort of growing nationalism similar to the Balkans. Moreover, Ottoman Policy towards the Zionists remained consistent: “Jewish Immigrants will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout the Ottoman Empire, excluding Palestine. They must submit to the laws of the empire and become Ottoman subjects.”[14] But this policy was not effectively carried out, as “Jewish immigrants entered the area as tourists or pilgrims; but once there, would acquire the protection of foreign consuls since European powers were eager to protect their own rights.”[15]

Nevertheless, immigration as well as native’s concern for its advancement, escalated. Some ways Arab-Natives addressed these concerns were newspapers that were published to essentially inform others of how negative consequences would result from establishing a Homeland in Palestine. Among these published newspapers) were al-Karmil in 1908 (whose editors were also Greek Orthodox Christians and Filastin (Palestine) founded in 1911. The intentions of these articles were not to inspire animosity towards the Jewish people but rather to seek empathy with the Arab-Inhabitants and this proved successful even on an international scale. Even “Rashid Rida, a Muslim reformer born in the Beirut vilayet but living in Cairo, published an article in 1902 in his journal al-Manar, stating that in his belief, “[Zionists] sought national sovereignty, not simply a haven from persecution.”[16]

All this was happening during a crucial point in time, the first World War. There were rising uncertainties of the turnout for Britain during World War I and with the Ottoman Empire just so happening to be on the side of the Central Powers, “call[ing] into question the future of their own empire, which meant the future of Palestine as well”[17], essentially placed both nations in a quagmire. For Zionists, this was the perfect opportunity to appeal to the British of their concerns. Chaim Weizmann, in particular was at making exceptional strides in persuading the British by establishing conversations with the right people at the most convenient time:

Weizmann had two long sessions with Dorothy [Rothschild] in lieu of meeting with her husband…[and] wrote to [Weizmann] less than two weeks later: ‘I have spoken to Mr. Charles Rothschild, not in any sort of way officially, but in the course of conversation he thoroughly approved of the idea [a Jewish Palestine] and in fact thought it would be the only possible future.’ Charles was…the younger brother of Walter Lionel Rothschild, who would become the Lord Rothschild to whom the Balfour Declaration would be addressed.[18]

The British were reluctant at first, but Weizmann’s connections, along with presentiment that the Russians were going to withdraw from the war, and perhaps even one’s assumption that Britain as a superpower, caused them to make whatever deals with anyone they felt would be behoove them in the end. Realistically, the British were aware they would have to do their best to make sure they could make good on the promises they delivered. In this case however, the British made sure their fingers crossed behind their backs, remained concealed when shaking hands with the Arabs. Unaware of the British’s plan to deceive them, Arabs had begun a revolt against their Ottoman Government, in hopes of acquiring an “[independent] Arab nation…and grasp the reins of their administration… and whereas they have found and felt that it [was] in the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them in the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions.”[19]

Letters were sent back and forth between Sharif Husayn and Sir Henry McMahon attempting to show congruity between the British and the Arabs however, statements from McMahon such as: “We take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Baghdad a and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives”, transparently shows the British metaphorically dragging their feet when asked to address Arab concerns. Suspicion grew subsequently but the Arabs remained oblivious to any double-crossing because McMahon, in his clever wording, maintained to the rebels: “rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition.”[20] Unbeknownst to Husayn however, McMahon has told others,

I do not for one minute go to the length of imagining what the present negotiations will go far to shape the future form of Arabia…What we have to arrive at now is to tempt the Arab peoples into the right path, detach them from the enemy and bring them over to our side.[21]

 

Ultimately, the Balfour Declaration was published in 1917. In its writing, the Balfour Declaration made sure to include that “Palestine [as] a national homeland for the Jewish people…clearly understood that nothing [would] be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”[22] However, careful reading of the Palestinian Mandate seems to contradict this notion of clemency. Instead, what is seen is undeniably, paternalistic colonialism. This sentiment was shared among most who viewed the Arabs; that even though the treatment of the Arabs were “indeed paternalistic, but paternalism seems to be necessary in dealing with backward countries”[23]. And as a result the British had to take control and make sure that the implementation of a Jewish Homeland ran smoothly. For example, article 16 of the Mandate states that: “The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government.”[24]

Unlike the Syrian or Iraqi mandate, which established a state and recognition of political rights of the people living within the boundaries of the state and once they reach the appropriate level of civilization (as determined by the mandate) then Syria would be ruled by Syrians, and Iraq would be ruled by Iraqis.[25] Although most people were well aware that “the Caliph, or head of the [Muslim] world, [had] a strong influence with [Muslims] in all countries. Formerly If the [Muslim] world [was] to be kept contented it appear[ed] necessary that there should be a Caliph whose authority is widely accepted.”[26]

The British mandate of Palestine, on the other hand, had only one party that was meant to be recognized, the Jewish Agency. The main pursuit of this agency was to implement and fulfill the obligations as stated in the Balfour Declaration by the British Government and install a Jewish homeland. Therefore, they could not recognize a politically local state (like Iraq or Syria) out of fear that the local population would reject power of the national homeland. In other words, any form of representative government, would undermine any British objectives as written in the Balfour Declaration.[27]

It is inarguable then, to say that British felt no reason to bring Palestine to independence as there was not going to be a British exit anytime soon. The crux was, to put it in simple words, stay until the job was done. “Of all this group of advocates of the restoration of the Jews to Palestine with British assistance, the most important was Colonel George Gawler, who had been governor of South Australia and…devoted the greater part of his activity to the Jewish cause.”[28] Gawler is important to note because “He proposed the gradual colonization of Palestine by Jews, small experimental colonies being established in the first instance. It was, however, essential to his scheme that Britain should undertake the protection of the colonies.”[29]

Subsequently, this caused some disorder for the British. During this early period, where Palestine was under military rule, the British military finally gained some insight of the wrong they had done to the Arabs. “In the case of Palestine these sympathies [of the British troops] are rather obviously with the Arabs, who have hitherto appeared to the disinterested observer to have been the victims of an unjust policy, forced upon them by the British Government.”[30] Simultaneously, there were many British doubts of the Balfour Declaration. Even “the British press, initially favorable to the Jewish national home policy, had by the early 1920s become increasingly skeptical if not hostile, and a movement opposed to the Balfour Declaration was gaining ground within parliament”[31]   Some considerable issues were raised; most of them essentially feeling a sense of remorse and pondering why a policy that could possibly result in retribution, should be implemented.

 

Looking back on the issue, this should not arouse a feeling of bewilderment. The threat of retaliation from the Arabs had been forewarned by many, yet resented. Pro-Zionists and British officials such as Herbert Samuel, believed “what we have got to face is the fact that as long as we persist in our Zionist policy we have got to maintain all our present forces in Palestine to enforce a policy hateful to the great majority”[32] With that, one can repudiate any statement that displays a feeling of remorse felt by the British; in that the British were well aware of what they were doing and even meant to colonize Palestine.

However, Britain is not the only one to be condemned; Zionists such as Jabotinsky, were well aware that “there was no misunderstanding…Zionists want…the one thing that Arabs do not want…[that] the Jews would gradually become the majority…and the future of the Arab minority would depend on the goodwill of the Jews…so there is no ‘misunderstanding’.”[33] Again, one mustn’t ignore that a number of Jews were critical of Zionism. For these Jewish people, they had worked relentlessly to assimilate in the country they lived in and the rise of Zionism would become problematic as to how loyal a Jewish citizen was to their nation. It is for that reason why Zionists must be allocated in their own category as “it stands today in its preliminary propaganda is not without considerable danger to the security and happiness of the Jews throughout the world.”[34]

Unapologetically, “Zionism’s responsibility for the Palestinian exodus and diaspora is an integral part of the genesis of the State of Israel. In their heart of hearts, most Israelis know this, which at least in part accounts for their pervasive sense of insecurity.”[35] Without a doubt, there has been an incessant struggle for Jews and perhaps the trials of the Arabs being overlooked has, and always shall be the norm; on the other hand,

fear of speaking out about one of the greatest injustices in modern history has hobbled, blinkered, muzzled many who know the truth and are in a position to serve it. For despite the abuse and vilification that any outspoken supporter of Palestinian rights and self-determination earns for him or herself, the truth deserves to be spoken, represented by an unafraid and compassionate intellectual.[36]

By retaining a fait accompli approach to the whole issue on Palestine, it only corroborates the idea of duplicity and hypocrisy, that Arabs were indeed exploited. And because the British were well aware of the consequences that were to come about, they purposefully allowed the Zionists to essentially, “get away with it.” Winston Churchill has compared the issue of Palestine to a dog in a manger claiming that, “I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may have lain there for a very long time.”[37] For the sake of argument, one can compromise that even if the dog who has always lain in the manger, can deal with not ultimately being given back what it once called its home. Yet. if nothing has been done to shelter the dog, there is no “final right.”

-Ahmed H. Sharma

Originally Written on the 27th of November, 2016

 

Bibliography:

 

British Mandate of Palestine. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1922. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 22 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Palestine_Mandate.html&gt;.

 

Churchill, Winston. “”Dog in Manger” Quote.” A-Z Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Nov. 2016. <http://www.azquotes.com/quote/1448775I%20do%20not%20agree%20that%20the%20dog%20in%20a%20manger%20has%20the%20final%20right%20to%20the%20manger%20even%20though%20he%20may%20have%20lain%20there%20for%20a%20very%20long%20time.%20I%20do%20not%20admit%20that%20right.%20I%20do%20not%20admit%20for%20instance,%20that%20a%20great%20wrong%20has%20been%20done%20to%20the%20Red%20Indians%20of%20America%20or%20the%20black%20people%20of%20Australia.&gt;.

 

Ha’am, Ahad. “The Jewish State and Jewish Problem” N.d. MS, Jewish Virtual Library. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 21 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/haam2.html&gt;.

 

Herzl, Theodor. “The Jewish State” 1896. MS. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 21 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2.html&gt;.

 

Huneidi, Sahar. “Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23.” Journal of Palestine Studies 27.2 (1998): 23-41. JSTOR. Web. 10 Oct. 2016.

 

Huntington, Ellsworth. “The Future of Palestine.” Geographical Review 7.1 (1919): 24-35. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Husayn, Sharif, and Henry McMahon. “The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.” Letter. N.d. The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (July 1915-August 1916) | Jewish Virtual Library. Jewish Virtual Library, n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html&gt;.

Hyamson, Albert M. “British Projects for Restoration of the Jews to Palestine.” Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society NO. 26 (1918): 127-64. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Jabotisnky, Vladimir Ze’ev. “The Iron Wall” 1923. MS. “The Iron Wall” | Jewish Virtual Library. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 25 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/ironwall.html&gt;.

 

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. “Utopian Zionism or Zionist Proselytism? A Reading of Herzl’s Altneuland.” Journal of Palestine Studies 30.4 (2001): 55-67. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Khalidi, Walid. “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine.” Journal of Palestine Studies 18.1 (1988): 4-33. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 16 Nov. 2016.

 

King, Henry Churchill, and Charles R. Crane. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1919. The King-Crane Report – World War I Document Archive. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 20 Nov. 2016. <https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_King-Crane_Report&gt;.

 

Letters from General Congreve and Air Vice Marshal Salmond, through A. M.  Trenchard, “Situation in Palestine,” 28 June 1921, PRO CO 733/17. (Source originally found in Sahar Huneidi’s Notes)

 

Mill, John Stuart. “Ch. 2 What Utilitarianism Is.” On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays. Ed. Tom Griffith. N.p.: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2016. 374-94. Print.

 

Palestine for the Palestinians?” Advocate of Peace through Justice 84.7 (1922): 245-46. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Pappe, Ilan. History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. JSTOR, June 2012. Web. Sept. 2016.

 

Said, Edward W. Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures. New York: Pantheon, 1994. 74. Print.

 

Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.

 

Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: St. Martin’s, 1988. Print.

 

Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. “Palestine Mandate.” University of Houston. 18 Oct. 2016. Lecture.

 

Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. “Palestinian Mandate Pt. 2.” University of Houston. 25 Oct. 2016. Lecture.

 

Wolf, Lucien. “The Zionist Peril.” The Jewish Quarterly Review 17.1 (1904): 1. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 19 Nov. 2016.

[1]Mill’s Utilitarianism and Other Essays

[2] King Crane Commission (JVL)

[3] King Crane Commission (JVL)

[4] Pappe, History of Modern Palestine

[5] Theodore Herzl, Der Judenstaat (JVL)

[6] Albert M. Hyamson, British Projects for Restoration

[7] Mohammed Khalidi, Utopian Zionism

[8] Theodore Herzl

[9] Charles Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

[10]Ahad Ha’am Jewish Question (JVL)

[11] Ha’am

[12] Muhammad Khalidi

[13] Future of Palestine

[14] Ottoman Document (Source: Charles Smith)

[15] Charles Smith

[16] Charles Smith

[17] Charles Smith

[18] Jonathan Schneer, Balfour Declaration

[19] Husayn – McMahon Correspondence (JVL)

[20] Husayn – McMahon Correspondence (JVL)

[21] Charles Smith

[22] Balfour Declaration (JVL)

[23] Ellsworth Huntington, Future of Palestine

[24] British Mandate of Palestine (JVL)

[25] Abdel Takriti Palestinian Mandate (Notes)

[26] Ellsworth Huntington

[27] Abdel Takriti, Palestinian Mandate Pt. 2 (Notes)

[28] Albert M. Hyamson

[29] Albert M. Hyamson

[30] Huneidi, Reversal of the Balfour Declaration

[31] Huneidi

[32] Herbert Samuel (Find Source)

[33] Jabotinsky’s The Iron Wall (JVL)

[34]  Lucien Wolf, Zionist Peril

[35] Walid Khalidi, Plan Dalet

[36] Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual

[37] Winston Churchill, Response to Peel Commission

 

It can be argued that it is human nature to seek approval from others and even attempt to make everyone happy although inarguably, it is impossible to do so. In the simplest of reasons, the impracticality is because one cannot make someone else happy without taking away someone else’s happiness.[1] In 1917, Lord Arthur James Balfour attempts to do just that with the Balfour Declaration, promising British assistance in establishing a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, after a series of discussions and debates, in order to appease the interests of the Zionists. In doing so however, Balfour has established the first of what will become many strands, that together make up a metaphorical spider web of neglected pleas of the present Arab population. Therefore, the intent of this essay is to contend that the British, alongside the Zionists, sought to strategically and purposefully, exploit the Arab Natives of Palestine in order to produce the Jewish State of Israel, despite Balfour professing in his Declaration to not infringe upon the rights of the Native Arab Population. This is proven largely in part due to the incessant neglect of Arab concerns, vagueness in promises made to address Arab concerns, and unheeded cautions by non-Arab notables to bandage broken promises.

As soon as the Balfour Declaration was passed, along with the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the land was divided amongst the French and British, as agreed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Naturally, there was opposition from the Arab natives (Christian and Muslim) but most significantly, there was pressure from the at the time, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who was reluctant with the idea of European nations being in control of a non-European population. To reiterate, the feeling amongst the native Arabs was mutual as described in the King Crane Commission that:

 

with the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or [Muslims] proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians-those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to [Muslims], are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for [Muslims] and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. [2]

 

Still, the British Government and members of the Peace Conference (members of the Triple Alliance after WWI) remained unmoved by this concern from the Arabs, and the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews, was to remain implemented. Despite the urging in the document to the notables forewarning that “The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms.”[3]

 

In order to fully grasp the gravity of the situation and why these concerns of the Arabs are treated as trivial, one must go back into the depths of history and see how it all started. During the Ottoman Empire, which at the time surrounded Palestine and what would later be known as the State of Israel, possessed a religiously diverse population; albeit despite an immense Muslim population, historians agree that citizens lived in relative harmony. Due to “the majority of the culture of Christians and Jews was like that of Muslims: determined not just by religious affiliation, but by geographical and social location.”[4] Meaning, that the idea of what dogma was practiced was irrelevant; especially if the social status of the individual was considered prosperous. However, this was not the case for Jews in Europe, where anti-Semitism was rampant and Jews, as Theodor Herzl described:

 

Wherever [the Jews] live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted…The forms of persecutions vary according to the countries and social circles in which they occur. In Russia, imposts are levied on Jewish Villages; in Rumania, a few persons are put to death; in Algeria, there are travelling agitators; In Germany, they get a good beating occasionally; in Austria, anti-Semites exercise terrorism over all public life; in Paris, the Jews are shut out of the so-called best social circles and excluded from clubs.[5]

 

Therefore, a solution was needed and quickly; the solution being, a safe-haven for the Jewish people. And the location of this sanctuary, was to be Palestine, a land they believed, from biblical times was owned by the Jews, and therefore, the time came for them to return and reclaim what rightfully belonged to them.

 

However, in doing so, the position of the Jewish question of Palestine [was] at the opening of the new era in which practical efforts took the place of dreams and theological disputations and the province hitherto monopolized by divines and philosophers was invaded by statesmen and other men of affairs.”[6] This was mainly due to the attitude Herzl developed towards the native Arab population, which was a “thoroughly repugnant image of Palestine, describing its towns and villages as no better than animal quarters.”[7]

 

It would be irremissible however, to not mention that Herzl was subsequently willing to be flexible in regards to the location of the Jewish state. Although, Palestine was the first choice, Herzl knew that the only way the Jewish people would be successful in acquiring a state of their own would require help from one of the major European powers. Therefore, as Herzl stated, “should the Powers declare themselves willing to admit our sovereignty over a neutral piece of land, then the Society will enter into negotiations for the possession of this land. Here two territories come under consideration, Palestine and Argentine.”[8]

One could make the assumption that Herzl, in his eagerness for European support, was willing to compromise with whatever that was handed to him. For instance, “in 1902, seeking the Al-Arish area in the Sinai Peninsula because it was adjacent to Palestine and could serve as an opening for future demands for expanded migration to the area. Joseph Chamberlain then British Colonial secretary, replied by suggesting land in British-Controlled East Africa, now part of Kenya. Though initially hostile to this idea, Herzl later saw it as granting a temporary haven that might give the Zionists leverage in their demands for Palestine.” [9] However, the idea of anything save Palestine was out of the question to other Zionists and for even the suggestion of this by Herzl, led other Zionists to suspect Herzl of being willing to abandon Zionism.  

Some Jewish notables such as essayist, Ahad Ha’am believed that in theory, the establishment of a Jewish state worked but was impractical as a result of many conflicting factors such as: “In the West it is the problem of the Jews, in the East the problem of Judaism. The one weighs on the individual, the other on the nation. The one is felt by Jews who have had a European education, the other by Jews whose education has been Jewish.”[10] Meaning that there was a strong disconnect amongst the people of Judaism and that their beliefs and ethics were on completely different wavelengths.  Ha’am argues, that Zionists were:

so spiritually far removed from Judaism, and have no true conception of its ­­­­­­nature and its value. Such men, however loyal to their State and devoted to its interests, will necessarily regard those interests as bound up with the foreign culture which they themselves have imbibed and they will endeavor, by moral persuasion or even by force, to implant that culture in the Jewish State, so that in the end the Jewish State will be a State of Germans or Frenchmen of the Jewish race.[11]

Future scholars such as Muhammad Ali Khalidi, will attest to this and ask the paradoxical question: “Why did Herzl, while explicitly disavowing utopianism, write of a utopia advocating ideas at variance with his own ideological principles, especially when the society described does not seem distinctively Jewish?”[12]

Unsurprisingly, the Muslim inhabitants were not pleased with the idea of Zionists taking the land they felt belonged to them. “As might be expected, the same thing is true of the resident Christians. Interestingly enough, the Palestinian Jews are also as much opposed…”[13] Not only were the citizens that were predominantly Muslim feeling even more hostility towards the foreigners but were also feeling a strong disdain for the Jewish population in particular; a group of people they once gave the Dhimmi status (a protected status for non-Muslims). Ottomans also were trying their best to prevent any sort of growing nationalism similar to the Balkans. Moreover, Ottoman Policy towards the Zionists remained consistent: “Jewish Immigrants will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout the Ottoman Empire, excluding Palestine. They must submit to the laws of the empire and become Ottoman subjects.”[14] But this policy was not effectively carried out, as “Jewish immigrants entered the area as tourists or pilgrims; but once there, would acquire the protection of foreign consuls since European powers were eager to protect their own rights.”[15]

Nevertheless, immigration as well as native’s concern for its advancement, escalated. Some ways Arab-Natives addressed these concerns were newspapers that were published to essentially inform others of how negative consequences would result from establishing a Homeland in Palestine. Among these published newspapers) were al-Karmil in 1908 (whose editors were also Greek Orthodox Christians and Filastin (Palestine) founded in 1911. The intentions of these articles were not to inspire animosity towards the Jewish people but rather to seek empathy with the Arab-Inhabitants and this proved successful even on an international scale. Even “Rashid Rida, a Muslim reformer born in the Beirut vilayet but living in Cairo, published an article in 1902 in his journal al-Manar, stating that in his belief, “[Zionists] sought national sovereignty, not simply a haven from persecution.”[16]

All this was happening during a crucial point in time, the first World War. There were rising uncertainties of the turnout for Britain during World War I and with the Ottoman Empire just so happening to be on the side of the Central Powers, “call[ing] into question the future of their own empire, which meant the future of Palestine as well”[17], essentially placed both nations in a quagmire. For Zionists, this was the perfect opportunity to appeal to the British of their concerns. Chaim Weizmann, in particular was at making exceptional strides in persuading the British by establishing conversations with the right people at the most convenient time:

Weizmann had two long sessions with Dorothy [Rothschild] in lieu of meeting with her husband…[and] wrote to [Weizmann] less than two weeks later: ‘I have spoken to Mr. Charles Rothschild, not in any sort of way officially, but in the course of conversation he thoroughly approved of the idea [a Jewish Palestine] and in fact thought it would be the only possible future.’ Charles was…the younger brother of Walter Lionel Rothschild, who would become the Lord Rothschild to whom the Balfour Declaration would be addressed.[18]

The British were reluctant at first, but Weizmann’s connections, along with presentiment that the Russians were going to withdraw from the war, and perhaps even one’s assumption that Britain as a superpower, caused them to make whatever deals with anyone they felt would be behoove them in the end. Realistically, the British were aware they would have to do their best to make sure they could make good on the promises they delivered. In this case however, the British made sure their fingers crossed behind their backs, remained concealed when shaking hands with the Arabs. Unaware of the British’s plan to deceive them, Arabs had begun a revolt against their Ottoman Government, in hopes of acquiring an “[independent] Arab nation…and grasp the reins of their administration… and whereas they have found and felt that it [was] in the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them in the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions.”[19]

Letters were sent back and forth between Sharif Husayn and Sir Henry McMahon attempting to show congruity between the British and the Arabs however, statements from McMahon such as: “We take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Baghdad a and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives”, transparently shows the British metaphorically dragging their feet when asked to address Arab concerns. Suspicion grew subsequently but the Arabs remained oblivious to any double-crossing because McMahon, in his clever wording, maintained to the rebels: “rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition.”[20] Unbeknownst to Husayn however, McMahon has told others,

I do not for one minute go to the length of imagining what the present negotiations will go far to shape the future form of Arabia…What we have to arrive at now is to tempt the Arab peoples into the right path, detach them from the enemy and bring them over to our side.[21]

 

Ultimately, the Balfour Declaration was published in 1917. In its writing, the Balfour Declaration made sure to include that “Palestine [as] a national homeland for the Jewish people…clearly understood that nothing [would] be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”[22] However, careful reading of the Palestinian Mandate seems to contradict this notion of clemency. Instead, what is seen is undeniably, paternalistic colonialism. This sentiment was shared among most who viewed the Arabs; that even though the treatment of the Arabs were “indeed paternalistic, but paternalism seems to be necessary in dealing with backward countries”[23]. And as a result the British had to take control and make sure that the implementation of a Jewish Homeland ran smoothly. For example, article 16 of the Mandate states that: “The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government.”[24]

Unlike the Syrian or Iraqi mandate, which established a state and recognition of political rights of the people living within the boundaries of the state and once they reach the appropriate level of civilization (as determined by the mandate) then Syria would be ruled by Syrians, and Iraq would be ruled by Iraqis.[25] Although most people were well aware that “the Caliph, or head of the [Muslim] world, [had] a strong influence with [Muslims] in all countries. Formerly If the [Muslim] world [was] to be kept contented it appear[ed] necessary that there should be a Caliph whose authority is widely accepted.”[26]

The British mandate of Palestine, on the other hand, had only one party that was meant to be recognized, the Jewish Agency. The main pursuit of this agency was to implement and fulfill the obligations as stated in the Balfour Declaration by the British Government and install a Jewish homeland. Therefore, they could not recognize a politically local state (like Iraq or Syria) out of fear that the local population would reject power of the national homeland. In other words, any form of representative government, would undermine any British objectives as written in the Balfour Declaration.[27]

It is inarguable then, to say that British felt no reason to bring Palestine to independence as there was not going to be a British exit anytime soon. The crux was, to put it in simple words, stay until the job was done. “Of all this group of advocates of the restoration of the Jews to Palestine with British assistance, the most important was Colonel George Gawler, who had been governor of South Australia and…devoted the greater part of his activity to the Jewish cause.”[28] Gawler is important to note because “He proposed the gradual colonization of Palestine by Jews, small experimental colonies being established in the first instance. It was, however, essential to his scheme that Britain should undertake the protection of the colonies.”[29]

Subsequently, this caused some disorder for the British. During this early period, where Palestine was under military rule, the British military finally gained some insight of the wrong they had done to the Arabs. “In the case of Palestine these sympathies [of the British troops] are rather obviously with the Arabs, who have hitherto appeared to the disinterested observer to have been the victims of an unjust policy, forced upon them by the British Government.”[30] Simultaneously, there were many British doubts of the Balfour Declaration. Even “the British press, initially favorable to the Jewish national home policy, had by the early 1920s become increasingly skeptical if not hostile, and a movement opposed to the Balfour Declaration was gaining ground within parliament”[31]   Some considerable issues were raised; most of them essentially feeling a sense of remorse and pondering why a policy that could possibly result in retribution, should be implemented.

 

Looking back on the issue, this should not arouse a feeling of bewilderment. The threat of retaliation from the Arabs had been forewarned by many, yet resented. Pro-Zionists and British officials such as Herbert Samuel, believed “what we have got to face is the fact that as long as we persist in our Zionist policy we have got to maintain all our present forces in Palestine to enforce a policy hateful to the great majority”[32] With that, one can repudiate any statement that displays a feeling of remorse felt by the British; in that the British were well aware of what they were doing and even meant to colonize Palestine.

However, Britain is not the only one to be condemned; Zionists such as Jabotinsky, were well aware that “there was no misunderstanding…Zionists want…the one thing that Arabs do not want…[that] the Jews would gradually become the majority…and the future of the Arab minority would depend on the goodwill of the Jews…so there is no ‘misunderstanding’.”[33] Again, one mustn’t ignore that a number of Jews were critical of Zionism. For these Jewish people, they had worked relentlessly to assimilate in the country they lived in and the rise of Zionism would become problematic as to how loyal a Jewish citizen was to their nation. It is for that reason why Zionists must be allocated in their own category as “it stands today in its preliminary propaganda is not without considerable danger to the security and happiness of the Jews throughout the world.”[34]

Unapologetically, “Zionism’s responsibility for the Palestinian exodus and diaspora is an integral part of the genesis of the State of Israel. In their heart of hearts, most Israelis know this, which at least in part accounts for their pervasive sense of insecurity.”[35] Without a doubt, there has been an incessant struggle for Jews and perhaps the trials of the Arabs being overlooked has, and always shall be the norm; on the other hand,

fear of speaking out about one of the greatest injustices in modern history has hobbled, blinkered, muzzled many who know the truth and are in a position to serve it. For despite the abuse and vilification that any outspoken supporter of Palestinian rights and self-determination earns for him or herself, the truth deserves to be spoken, represented by an unafraid and compassionate intellectual.[36]

By retaining a fait accompli approach to the whole issue on Palestine, it only corroborates the idea of duplicity and hypocrisy, that Arabs were indeed exploited. And because the British were well aware of the consequences that were to come about, they purposefully allowed the Zionists to essentially, “get away with it.” Winston Churchill has compared the issue of Palestine to a dog in a manger claiming that, “I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may have lain there for a very long time.”[37] For the sake of argument, one can compromise that even if the dog who has always lain in the manger, can deal with not ultimately being given back what it once called its home. Yet. if nothing has been done to shelter the dog, there is no “final right.”

 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

British Mandate of Palestine. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1922. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 22 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Palestine_Mandate.html&gt;.

 

Churchill, Winston. “”Dog in Manger” Quote.” A-Z Quotes. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Nov. 2016. <http://www.azquotes.com/quote/1448775I%20do%20not%20agree%20that%20the%20dog%20in%20a%20manger%20has%20the%20final%20right%20to%20the%20manger%20even%20though%20he%20may%20have%20lain%20there%20for%20a%20very%20long%20time.%20I%20do%20not%20admit%20that%20right.%20I%20do%20not%20admit%20for%20instance,%20that%20a%20great%20wrong%20has%20been%20done%20to%20the%20Red%20Indians%20of%20America%20or%20the%20black%20people%20of%20Australia.&gt;.

 

Ha’am, Ahad. “The Jewish State and Jewish Problem” N.d. MS, Jewish Virtual Library. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 21 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/haam2.html&gt;.

 

Herzl, Theodor. “The Jewish State” 1896. MS. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 21 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2.html&gt;.

 

Huneidi, Sahar. “Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23.” Journal of Palestine Studies 27.2 (1998): 23-41. JSTOR. Web. 10 Oct. 2016.

 

Huntington, Ellsworth. “The Future of Palestine.” Geographical Review 7.1 (1919): 24-35. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Husayn, Sharif, and Henry McMahon. “The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.” Letter. N.d. The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (July 1915-August 1916) | Jewish Virtual Library. Jewish Virtual Library, n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html&gt;.

Hyamson, Albert M. “British Projects for Restoration of the Jews to Palestine.” Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society NO. 26 (1918): 127-64. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Jabotisnky, Vladimir Ze’ev. “The Iron Wall” 1923. MS. “The Iron Wall” | Jewish Virtual Library. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 25 Nov. 2016. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/ironwall.html&gt;.

 

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. “Utopian Zionism or Zionist Proselytism? A Reading of Herzl’s Altneuland.” Journal of Palestine Studies 30.4 (2001): 55-67. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Khalidi, Walid. “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine.” Journal of Palestine Studies 18.1 (1988): 4-33. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 16 Nov. 2016.

 

King, Henry Churchill, and Charles R. Crane. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1919. The King-Crane Report – World War I Document Archive. Jewish Virtual Library. Web. 20 Nov. 2016. <https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_King-Crane_Report&gt;.

 

Letters from General Congreve and Air Vice Marshal Salmond, through A. M.  Trenchard, “Situation in Palestine,” 28 June 1921, PRO CO 733/17. (Source originally found in Sahar Huneidi’s Notes)

 

Mill, John Stuart. “Ch. 2 What Utilitarianism Is.” On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays. Ed. Tom Griffith. N.p.: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2016. 374-94. Print.

 

Palestine for the Palestinians?” Advocate of Peace through Justice 84.7 (1922): 245-46. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.

 

Pappe, Ilan. History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. JSTOR, June 2012. Web. Sept. 2016.

 

Said, Edward W. Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures. New York: Pantheon, 1994. 74. Print.

 

Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.

 

Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: St. Martin’s, 1988. Print.

 

Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. “Palestine Mandate.” University of Houston. 18 Oct. 2016. Lecture.

 

Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. “Palestinian Mandate Pt. 2.” University of Houston. 25 Oct. 2016. Lecture.

 

Wolf, Lucien. “The Zionist Peril.” The Jewish Quarterly Review 17.1 (1904): 1. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 19 Nov. 2016.

[1]Mill’s Utilitarianism and Other Essays

[2] King Crane Commission (JVL)

[3] King Crane Commission (JVL)

[4] Pappe, History of Modern Palestine

[5] Theodore Herzl, Der Judenstaat (JVL)

[6] Albert M. Hyamson, British Projects for Restoration

[7] Mohammed Khalidi, Utopian Zionism

[8] Theodore Herzl

[9] Charles Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

[10]Ahad Ha’am Jewish Question (JVL)

[11] Ha’am

[12] Muhammad Khalidi

[13] Future of Palestine

[14] Ottoman Document (Source: Charles Smith)

[15] Charles Smith

[16] Charles Smith

[17] Charles Smith

[18] Jonathan Schneer, Balfour Declaration

[19] Husayn – McMahon Correspondence (JVL)

[20] Husayn – McMahon Correspondence (JVL)

[21] Charles Smith

[22] Balfour Declaration (JVL)

[23] Ellsworth Huntington, Future of Palestine

[24] British Mandate of Palestine (JVL)

[25] Abdel Takriti Palestinian Mandate (Notes)

[26] Ellsworth Huntington

[27] Abdel Takriti, Palestinian Mandate Pt. 2 (Notes)

[28] Albert M. Hyamson

[29] Albert M. Hyamson

[30] Huneidi, Reversal of the Balfour Declaration

[31] Huneidi

[32] Herbert Samuel (Find Source)

[33] Jabotinsky’s The Iron Wall (JVL)

[34]  Lucien Wolf, Zionist Peril

[35] Walid Khalidi, Plan Dalet

[36] Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual

[37] Winston Churchill, Response to Peel Commission